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THE REGULATION OF CROSS-BORDER
PUBLIC OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
Present and Futuret
Alexander B. St John
The European Union (E.U.)' has witnessed dramatic progress in
recent years in terms of both monetary integration and the fortification
of its position as a financial and economic powerhouse with the
commencement of the European Monetary Union (E.M.U.), the
introduction of the Euro as the European Union's single currency, and
the formation of a European Central Bank.2 While the E.U.'s success
with monetary integration has been impressive, one area that remains
incomplete is the integration of the E.U.'s various equity markets into a
cohesive and singular capital market that would facilitate simpler
capital-raising efforts by way of securities issuances.3
' The Holland & Hart Private International Law Award is a monetary award generously
presented by the law firm of Holland & Hart LLP to a University of Denver College of
Law student for a paper written on a topic in the private sphere of international law.
* J.D. candidate, May 2002, University of Denver College of Law; B.A., Northwestern
University, 1998.
I wish to thank Trip Mackintosh for sponsoring this award as well as for his commitment
to promoting private international legal studies at the University of Denver. I also want
to thank Professor Ved Nanda for his thoughtful comments on this article. Finally, I
want to thank my colleagues at the Denver Journal of International Law & Policy for
their editorial contributions on this article and for their tireless dedication to this
Journal.
1. The E.U. currently consists of fifteen Member States: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. See European Union in
the U.S., available at httpJ/www.eurunion.org/statesfhome.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2002).
2. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commission, COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9, 9 (1999).
3. See id. See also Financial Services: Implementing the Framework for Financial
Markets: Action Plan, COM(99)232 final at 6, available at httpJ/europa.eu.int/cornm/
imternalmarket/en/finances/generallactionen.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2002) [hereinafter
Financial Services Action Plan]; Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Prospectus to be Published when Securities are
Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading, 2001 O.J. (C240E) 272, 272 (recognizing the
need to completely overhaul the two existing and out-dated E.U. prospectus directives)
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Those practicing in the European securities industry acknowledge
that the directive-based regulatory framework currently in place does
not produce the requisite efficiency to make pan-E.U. public offerings a
reality. The European Commission attempts to rectify that with its
Proposed Prospectus Directive submitted in June 2001.4 Recognizing
the deficiencies that segmented financial markets create for capital-
raising by companies wishing to offer securities to the public of more
than one Member State and the changing financial landscape in
Europe, the E.U. Commission first proposed ways to ease the raising of
capital on an E.U.-wide basis in its 1999 Financial Services Action
Plan.5 The Committee of Wise Men produced Initial and Final Reports
on the Regulation of European Securities Markets in November 2000
and February 2001, respectively, spelling out the shortcomings of
current European regulation and the benefits of greater capital markets
integration. Additionally, the Forum of European Securities
Commissions (FESCO)7 produced a report in December 2000 for the
European Commission's consideration 8 proposing concrete steps that
would allow European issuers to make E.U.-wide public offerings
"without having to produce duplicative sets of documentation or to
respond to numerous additional national requirements."9  In
consideration of the need for investor protection, the FESCO proposal-
also provided particulars for how best to facilitate the access to
[hereinafter Proposed Prospectus Directive].
4. See Proposed Prospectus Directive, supra note 3, at 272.
5. Financial Services Action Plan, supra note 3, at 6.
6. See Initial Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European
Securities Markets (Nov. 9, 2000) at 4 & 15, available at
http'J/europa.eu.int/comninternal-
market/enlfinances/banks/report.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Initial
Report]. Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European
Securities Markets (Feb. 15, 2001), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-marketen/finances/
lamfalussyen.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2002).
7. FESCO was a body made up of the chairmen of seventeen statutory securities
regulators of the European Economic Area and works to improve the cooperation between
Europe's securities regulators. See FESCO's Organisation, available at
httpJ/www.europefesco.org/vllpOrganisation.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2001). FESCO's
work has been taken over by the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), a
body that was established by European Commission Decision issued in June 2001,
following recommendations contained in the Final Report of the Lamfalussy-chaired
Committee of Wise Men published in February 2001. See Presentation of CESR, What is
CESR? available at http-//www.europefesco.org/vllPresentation-ofCESR.htm (last
visited Feb. 5, 2002).
8. See A "European Passport" for Issuers, A Report for the EU Commission,
Fesco/00-138b (Dec. 20, 2000), available at
http://www.bwa.at/download/European-passport-issuers.
doc (last visited Feb. 21, 2002) [hereinafter European Passport Report].
9. Id. at 3.
VOL. 29:3
2001REGULATION OF CROSS-BORDER PUBLIC OFFERINGS IN THE E.U. 241
approved documents to all European investors.'" The end result of
these reports and proposals is the European Commission's Proposed
Prospectus Directive, a document that adopts the notion of a European
'passport' for issuers, but has been the subject of serious debate and
criticism, and will be discussed in greater detail later.
The purpose of this paper is two-fold: (i) to clearly and concisely
address the relevant legislative directives currently applicable to a
public offering of securities (whether listed or unlisted) in multiple E.U.
Member States, and (ii) to examine how recent proposals, including the
Proposed Prospectus Directive, attempt to reconcile their faults to
better facilitate cross-border securities offerings without sacrificing
investor protection in the process. The paper focuses exclusively on
those issuers incorporated under the laws of an E.U. Member State and
examines the public offering of equity securities, as opposed to bonds, or
other security instruments." PART I examines the structure of the
E.U.'s directive-based regulation of the capital markets. PART II
examines the applicable directives and procedures involved in
facilitating cross-border offerings by distinguishing the requirements
for offering exchange-listed securities from unlisted securities. PART III
examines the perceived shortcomings of the E.U. directives currently in
force in this area that have resulted in a scarcity of cross-border
offerings in practice. PART IV examines the proposed procedures under
FESCO's European Passport Report, and the current legislative status
surrounding the harmonization of E.U. law pertaining to cross-border
offerings, by focusing on the Proposed Prospectus Directive. This part
also examines further hurdles that implementation of a harmonized
system that will need to be overcome based on the realities of the
current system and the outcry from the securities industry. Finally, a
brief conclusion is provided.
PART I:THE E.U. SYSTEM OF REGULATING SECURITIES OFFERINGS
The E.U.'s current system of securities regulation, a product of over
twenty years of directive drafting and implementation, differs
significantly from that of the United States in that it lacks any sort of
legal uniformity in terms of laws that apply to pan-E.U. securities
offerings."2 While one commentator has described the E.U. as "the
world's primary actor in accomplishing multinational regulatory
10. Id. These "particulars" involved the creation of procedures whereby the
prospectus and disclosure documents provided to the primary listing authority would be
valid in other jurisdictions where the offering was to be made subject only to a notification
requirement. Id.
11. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1933) (providing an exhaustive
definition of the term "security").
12. See Giovanni Nardulli and Antonio Segni, EU Cross Border Securities Offerings:
An Overview, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 887, 887 (1996).
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harmony in the field of securities regulation," 3 the E.U. has not been
successful in fully integrating its capital markets. Generally speaking,
the U.S.'s interstate sale of securities calls for the application of
uniform federal laws and regulations - primarily by the Securities Act
of 193314 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934" - and involves the
jurisdiction of a single compliance and enforcement supervisor: the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).16  On the other hand,
under the E.U. system, there lacks both a uniform system of laws that
apply generally to pan-E.U. securities offerings and a supervisory
agency, or "super-regulator," to ensure compliance with and
enforcement of laws pertaining to financial markets.' In place of an
over-arching regulatory scheme, E.U. Member States maintain
jurisdiction over securities offerings occurring within their borders,
which means that cross-border securities offerings are forced to
"conform with diverse national rules and regulations" and creates
certain regulatory inconsistencies insofar as providing information is
concerned. 8
The E.U. rules relating to the securities industry and, more
specifically, to the public offering of securities consist of various
directives, a form of binding legislation upon each Member State to
which the directive is addressed as to the result that it is to achieve, but
which leaves to the discretion of national authorities "the choice of form
and methods." 9 Directives are considered the most flexible of the
various forms of legislation that can be adopted by E.U. Member States
since the Member States must implement directives through their own
ad-hoc national legislation, thereby maintaining their own
13. Manning Gilbert Warren III, The European Union's Investment Services Directive,
15 U. PA. J. INT'L. Bus. L. 181, 181 (1994).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.
16. See A Ragbag of Reform: Europe's Ragbag of Financial Regulation: National
Governments and EU Policymakers are Reshaping Europe's System of Financial
Regulation. But They Cannot Agree on Which Shape will Make Their Markets Work Best,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 3, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7317931.
17. See Nardulli, supra note 12, at 888. See also Initial Report, supra note 6, at
Introduction. See generally Karme], supra note 2 (calling for the creation of a single SEC-
type regulator to watch over the E.U.'s financial markets).
18. See Nardulli, supra note 12, at 887. See also Proposed Prospectus Directive,
supra note 3, at Explanatory Memorandum (recognizing that differences in terms of
practices and interpretations based on "distinct traditions within the European Union
regarding the content and layout of prospectuses" and the time required to check
information contained in those prospectuses cause inconsistencies, thereby fragmenting
the E.U.'s financial markets).
19. Article 249 (ex Article 189), CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 173 (1997),
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/ec-cons-treaty-en.pdf [hereinafter
EC TREATY].
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jurisdiction. 2' Therefore, the various directives related to the E.U.
securities markets cannot and do not represent a superior system of
legal authority for multi-state transactions.2' Rather, in the words of
two commentators, the aim of the E.U. securities offering directives is:
to form a common background of provisions in order to create uniform
local laws based on the following priorities: (1) to ensure the existence
of minimum standards of quality and information concerning the
securities traded, the issuers and the offerors involved; (2) to ensure
thorough supervision of the securities market at a local and global
level, by fostering cooperation among national regulatory bodies; and
(3) to make national markets accessible to issuers and intermediaries
who have been admitted and are regulated in other Member States
through the elimination of regulatory barriers that are not justified by
material interests and de facto impede the free circulation of services
and products.2
Accordingly, the European Union's use of directives still requires
legal counsel to examine and comply with the varying national laws of
the Member States in which their client-issuers wish to list or offer for
sale securities, and prevents issuers from obtaining a single "passport"
that would allow an issuer to offer its securities in. multiple Member
States, without having to comply with the local regulations of each
Member State in which it offers the securities.n Thus, while an issuer
may technically offer its securities to investors in some or all of the
E.U.'s Member States, not only will that issuer have to check the
specific directives that will apply to it depending on whether the
issuer's securities offered are (i) listed on a stock exchange (in which
case the Listing Particulars Directive' applies), or (ii) unlisted (in
which case the Public Offering Prospectus Directiven applies), but will
20. See TOM KENNEDY, LEARNING EUROPEAN LAW: A PRIMER AND VADE-MECUM 114
(1998) (stating that directives are considered to represent the "collective will of the
Member States to achieve certain objectives" but leaves to those Member States to whom
the directive is addressed the implementation means by which they are to achieve that
result "in accordance with their own legal, constitutional or social circumstances.").
21. See Nardulli, supra note 12, at 888.
22. Nardulli, supra note 12, at 888 (emphasis added).
23. The concept of a single issuer "passport" has gained popularity since being
introduced by the Lisbon European Council in March 2000, recommended by FESCO in
its report to the European Commission "A European Passport for Issuers" and adopted by
the European Commission in its Proposed Prospectus Directive as a means of
"simplify[ing] regulatory compliance for issuers" and ensuring investor protection. See
Proposed Prospectus Directive, supra note 3, at Explanatory Memorandum.
24. Council Directive 80/390/EEC, 1980 O.J. (L100) 1, amended by Council Directive
87/345/EEC, 1987 O.J. (L 15/81), Council Directive No. 90/211/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 112/24),
and Council Directive No. 94/18/EEC, 1994 O.J. (L 135/1) [hereinafter Listing Particulars
Directive].
25. Council Directive 89/298/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L124) 8 [hereinafter Public Offering
Prospectus Directive].
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have to check each Member State's specific laws on public offerings and
disclosure of information.26
PART II:THE DIRECTIVES CURRENTLY APPLICABLE TO EUROPEAN PAN-
E.U. PUBLIC OFFERINGS
Some commentators attribute the surge in popularity among
European companies deciding to "go public" by issuing equity securities
stems to two sources: under-capitalization and the privatization of state
entities. Others attribute the popularity of securities issuances to the
introduction of the Euro as the lone currency across the Member States,
which effectively created a single market for cash, as well as to the
technological developments now available for equity research and
electronic trading.' Generally speaking, a public offering is undertaken
in one of two ways:
[F]irst, securities can be listed on one or more stock exchanges in the
same or in different countries. Second, securities can be distributed
without using the market created by the stock exchange, but by
offering the securities directly into the large financial market of
Continental Europe.29
Employing the latter method, as opposed to using a market created by
the stock exchanges, allows direct distribution of securities into
Europe's large financial market without jumping through the dual
regulatory hoops required by the stock exchange rules and applicable
directives when undertaking an exchange listing. Both methods are
discussed below, beginning with the offering of securities on multiple
stock exchanges.
A. Public Offerings of Exchange-Listed Securities
In Europe, the national law of the stock exchange governs
securities trading activities on a stock exchange. 3' As a preliminary
matter, it is the law of the stock exchange that "will decide whether the
financial instrument in question is a security and is therefore qualified
26. See Hal S. Scott, Internationalization of Primary Public Securities Markets, 63
LAW & CON'TEMP. PROBS. 82 (2000).
27. Gerhard Wegen and Christian Lindemann, The Law Applicable to Public
Offerings in Continental Europe, in THE LAW OF CROSS-BORDER SECURITIES
TRANSACTIONS 153 (Hans Van Houte ed., 1999). See also Initial Report, supra note 6, at 9
(pointing out that the use of equity financing and corporate bonds by European companies
has overtaken the traditional reliance on bank credit for corporate financing).
28. See Ragbag of Reform, supra note 16.
29. Wegen, supra note 27.
30. Wegen, supra note 27, at 154.
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to be listed.""1 However, while the national law of the stock exchange
governs, the legal regime for listing equity securities is not purely
national: an over-arching concept that governs cross-border offering of
equity securities is "mutual recognition," (sometimes referred to as
"reciprocal recognition"12 ) a concept prevalent throughout E.U. law as a
means of harmonizing the laws of its Member States, and in simplest
terms means that what is acceptable in one country is recognized as
acceptable in a second country.' As applied to exchange-based offerings
of securities, mutual recognition simply means that a prospectus used
for a "primary listing" in one Member State (the home state) is
sufficient for the "secondary listing" on the stock exchange of a second
Member State (the host state), subject to minor differences in the
States' legal regimes.' The policy choice behind employing mutual
recognition in European securities law is and was of course to produce
some form of harmony in the Member States' securities regulations,
thereby facilitating greater efficiency in Europe's fragmented securities
markets and keeping the cost of multi-state offerings reasonable. With
an understanding of mutual recognition in mind, the context behind the
directives most relevant to offering securities on stock exchanges of two
or more Member States becomes somewhat easy to understand.3 5
1. The Admission Directive
As its title pronounces, Council Directive 79/279/EEC Coordinating
the Conditions for the Admission of Securities for Official Stock
Exchange Listing, 3 has the purpose of outlining the conditions for
listing on a stock exchange of a Member States, taking into account the
dual goals of (i) ensuring maintenance of adequate investor protection
and (ii) allowing greater "interpenetration of the national securities
markets" and thereby "contribut[ing] to the prospect of establishing a
European capital market."3' The Council recognized that coordination
by the Admission Directive was limited to the establishment of
"minimum conditions for admission" and this partial coordination
"constitute[d] a first step towards subsequent closer alignment of the
rules of Member States in this field."3 Article 3 of the Admission
31. Id. at 156.
32. See Nardulli, supra note 12, at 890.
33. Cf id.
34. See Wegen, supra note 27, at 154.
35. For comparative summaries of the three exchange listing directives described
below, see generally Nardulli, supra note 12; See also Todd A. Sulger, Harmonization of
the Securities Market Regulations in the European Union: Is the Price Tag too High?, 29
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 221, 224-228 (1998).
36. Council Directive 79/279/EEC, 1979 O.J. (L 66) 21, amended by Council Directive
821148/EEC, 1982 O.J. (L 62) 22 [hereinafter Admission Directive].
37. See id., at Preamble.
38. Id.
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Directive requires Member States to ensure that "securities may not be
admitted to official listing on any stock exchange situated or operating
within their territory unless the conditions laid down by this Directive
are satisfied" thereby establishing minimum common listing criteria for
equity and debt securities that list on E.U. Members' stock exchanges.39
It is important to note that since the Admission Directive defines only
minimum standards, the specific requirements of each country's stock
exchange need to be consulted and adhered to as well. The Admission
Directive provides Member States with discretion to impose more
stringent requirements than those set forth in the Directive, so long as
these requirements are applied on a non-discriminatory basis to all
issuers who seek admission for listing of securities on a Member State
exchange. For example, Article 5(4) of the Directive states that Member
States are free to, "in accordance with their own national rules, require
issuers admitted to official listings to inform the public on a regular
basis of their financial position and the general course of their
business.4 Thus, due to the Admission Directive's adherence to
mutual recognition, the content of the admission requirements for
listing securities for trading on a stock exchange in each E.U. Member
State, though not uniform, are very similar.
2. The Interim Reports Directive
Following closely on the heels of the Admission Directive and the
Listing Particulars Directive (discussed below), the European Council
adopted in February 1982 Council Directive 82/1211EEC on Information
to be Published in a Regular Basis by Companies the Shares of Which
have been Admitted to Official Stock Exchange Listing.41 Commonly
referred to as the Interim Reports Directive, this Directive complements
the Admission Directive's requirements on the publication of
information, and requires company-issuers of equity securities listed on
Member State stock exchanges to produce half-yearly reports to relate
the company's activities and profits and losses for the relevant six-
month period in both explanatory and tabular formats.4 The report
must indicate both current financial figures and figures from the
preceding financial year showing, at a minimum, the issuer's net asset
turnover and the issuer's before-tax profit or loss, so that investors can
make an informed assessment as to the trends of the company's
activities and profits and losses.43 An explanatory statement must also
be included indicating the company's business prospects for the
39. See id., at art. 3.
40. See Admission Directive supra note 36, at art. 5(4).
41. Council Directive 82/121EEC, 1982 O.J. (L 48) 26 [hereinafter Interim Reports
Directive].
42. See id., at arts. 4 and 5.
43. See Interim Reports Directive, supra note 41, at arts. 4 and 5.
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remainder of the financial year as well as "special factors" that would
shed light on the company's activities."
These continuing reporting requirements are akin to the annual
10K and quarterly 10Q forms that must be published by issuers in the
United States under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.4" Again, the
purpose of the notice requirements is to allow investors to make
informed appraisals of the security issue. The notice requirements
fulfill the Directive's goal of providing equivalent investor protection for
the entire E.U. "throughout the period during which the securities are
listed" and "contributing towards the establishment of a genuine
Community capital market by permitting a fuller interpenetration of
securities markets."46
Additionally, in light of the fact that the E.U. currently lacks
uniform accounting standards, 7  determining which accounting
standards have to be met in these reports "is not resolved by the
application of mandatory national standards or regulations of the stock
exchange involved, but by using conflict of law rules."" Therefore, the
law governing the company determines the law applicable to accounting
standards, and "the law governing the company is determined by the
rules of conflict of laws of.the Member State in which the listing is
sought."9 The different accounting systems employed by each Member
State are and remain a major impediment to "ensur[ing] the effective
protection of investors and the proper operation of stock exchanges " "
envisioned by the Council in this Directive. Furthermore, heightened
disclosure standards employed by certain Member State exchanges
means that what may be appropriate for one exchange is lacking in
detail for another exchange.
3. The Listing Particulars Directive
Of the directives described herein, the Listing Particulars Directive
is perhaps of greatest significance in terms of what is currently going on
legislatively in the E.U. securities field. This directive was adopted in
1980 in order to "safeguard ... actual and potential investors" by
requiring that Member States "ensure that the admission of securities
44. Id.
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1933) ("Periodical and Other Reports").
46. See Interim Reports Directive, supra note 41, at Preamble.
47. See Initial Report, supra note 6, at 16. See also Karel Van Hulle, Accounting &
Auditing: Developments in the EU, AccT. IR. 10 (Apr. 4, 2001), available at 2001 WL
15067274 (explaining that the E.U. is undergoing efforts to converge its accounting
directives in order to produce accounting standards that are in line with International
Accounting Standards (IAS)).
48. Wegen, supra note 27, at 156.
49. Id.
50. See Interim Reports Directive, supra note 41, at Preamble.
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
to official listing on a stock exchange situated or operating within their
territories [be] conditional upon the publication of an information sheet"
referred to as "listing particulars".51 Though it does not use the term
"prospectus" anywhere within the Directive, the Listing Particulars
Directive and the Public Offering Prospectus Directive (discussed
below) are the E.U.'s two "Prospectus Directives," and are the subjects
of reform in the European Commission's Proposed Prospectus Directive.
The Listing Particulars Directive applies to those securities that are
"the subject of an application for admission to official listing on a stock
exchange situated or operating within a Member State."52 Article 4 of
the Listing Particulars Directive requires that the listing particulars
contain information on the particular issuer and securities of which
application is being made "necessary to enable investors ... to make an
informed assessment of the assets and liabilities, financial position,
profits and losses, and prospects of the issuer and of the rights
attaching to such securities."3 At a minimum, the listing particulars, or
information sheet, contains: information concerning the issuer, the
security, the corporation's capital position, business activities and
financial position, the officers and directors of the corporation, and the
corporation's recent developments, as well as current business
prospects.5
To reiterate, the Listing Particulars Directive, like the other
Directives relating to the listing of securities on stock exchanges in the
E.U., requires only that Member States adopt the minimum standards
and guidelines set out in those Directives. Member States remain free
to supplement the minimum requirements with more extensive
information disclosure requirements and have done so." Consequently,
levels of disclosure vary from Member State to Member State; while all
States meet the minimum threshold level of disclosure required by the
Listing Particulars Directive, others require a heightened standard of
disclosure from issuers wishing to list in their forum.
As one commentator points out, the Listing Particulars Directive
serves as a limitation on an issuer's ability to "forum shop" for favorable
disclosure rules within the E.U. by requiring that the issuer list in the
country of its registered office, i.e., its home state if it will be listing its
securities there at all.' By way of example, this commentator points
out that this limitation serves as a mechanism to prevent a French
company seeking to list its securities on the Paris Bourse and other
exchanges from first listing its securities on another Member State's
51. See Listing Particulars Directive, supra note 24, at Preamble & art. 3.
52. See id. at art. 1.
53. See id. at art. 4.
54. See id. at art. 8.
55. See Initial Report, supra note 6, at 2 & 16.
56. See Scott, supra note 26, at 82.
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exchange which might have less disclosure requirements than those in
France." The French issuer would have to list in Paris first, with the
result that its securities would be subject to French disclosure rules
throughout the E.U.5 This bars a circumvention of home state
disclosure regulations in states with more stringent disclosure
regulation, and is consistent with the notions of investor protection, an
overriding principle among all securities regulation in the E.U.
In summing up the three E.U. Directives relating to stock
exchange-listed securities, the mutual recognition-based directives fail
to harmonize securities listing requirements in the Member States.
While the principle of mutual recognition again applies to a substantial
part of the conditions for a secondary listing (e.g., a listing on a second
or third stock exchange),59 the fact that the directives spell out only
minimum requirements and require that domestic law in each Member
State where listing is sought be consulted to determine the additional
requirements that the State mandates above and beyond those
contained in the directives means that issuers are required to incur
additional trouble and expense to facilitate multi-stock exchange
listings.
B. Public Offerings of Unlisted Securities
A second way to publicly offer securities is through open market
transactions whereby an issuer, care of an underwriter or underwriting
syndicate, offers the securities to the public by direct purchase, as
opposed to listing them on a stock exchange.' As discussed above,
when securities are going to be listed on an official stock exchange the
prospectus, or "listing particulars," must conform to the minimum
specifications of the Listing Particulars Directive as adopted by the
Member States.
The purpose behind the Public Offering Prospectus Directive," on
the other hand, is to set out how prospectuses should be prepared where
unlisted securities, or transferable securities, which include securities
admitted to trading on a regulated market, but not listed on an official
stock exchange, are offered to the public.6 Like the Listing Particulars
Directive,6 the Public Offering Prospectus Directive sets out the
framework for information disclosure when transferable securities are
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See Wegen, supra note 27, at 157.
60. See id., at 160.
61. Public Offering Prospectus Directive, supra note 25.
62. See Wegen, supra note 27, at 160.
63. Listing Particulars Directive, supra note 24.
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
offered to the public." Article 1 of the Public Offering Prospectus
Directive establishes that the Directive applies to "transferable
securities which are offered to the public for the first time in a Member
State provided that these securities are not already listed on a stock
exchange situated or operating in that Member State."" Article 4
requires that Member States ensure that a prospectus be published by
an issuer offering transferable securities to the public within their
territories, with certain exceptions to this rule listed in Article 5.6
Adhering to the mutual recognition concept, Directive 90/211/EEC
amending the Listing Particulars Directive points out that Article 21 of
the Public Offering Prospectus Directive provides that "where public
offers are made simultaneously or within short intervals of one another
in two or more Member States, a public-offer prospectus drawn up and
approved in accordance with Article 7, 8 or 12 of that Directive must be
recognized as a public-offer prospectus in the other Member States. "'8
Furthermore, Directive 90/211/EEC points out that:
where application for admission to official listing in one or more
Member States is made and the securities have been the subject of a
public-offer prospectus drawn up and approved in any Member State
in accordance with Article 7, 8 or 12 of the Public Offering Directive in
the three months preceding the application for admission [to the stock
exchange), the public-offer prospectus shall be recognized, subject to
any translation, as listing particulars in the Member State or States in
which application for admission to official listing is made, without its
being necessary to obtain the approval of the competent authorities of
that Member State or those Member States and without their being
able to require that additional information be included in the
prospectus.6'
The competent authorities may, however, require that the prospectus
include information specific to the market of the country of admission
"concerning, in particular, the income tax system, the financial
organizations retained to act as paying agents for the issuer in the
country of admission and the ways in which notices to investors are
published." 9 Here again, Member States remain free to make issuers
supplement their prospectuses with additional information, thereby
hindering the goal of capital market integration.
PART III:SHORTCOMINGS OF THE E.U. DIRECTIVES AND POSSIBLE
64. Her Majesty's Treasury, Public Offers of Securities 17 (1998), available at
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/html/posec.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2001) [hereinafter Public
Offers Report].
65. Public Offering Prospectus Directive, supra note 25, at art. 1.
66. See id. at arts. 4 & 5.
67. Council Directive 90/211/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L112) 3.5.
68. Id. at art. 2(1).
69. Public Offering Prospectus Directive, supra note 25 at art. 21.
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REASONS FOR THE SHORTAGE OF CROSS-BORDER OFFERINGS
While the mutual recognition principle contained in the directives
summarized above allows offers of securities in multiple Member States
of the E.U., few cross-border offers have been effectuated in reality.0 In
fact, one commentator points out "that the 1999 and 2000 Deutsche
Telekom distributions are the only instances of a European-wide public
offering."7  A 1998 United Kingdom Treasury report "proposing
amendments to the U.K. legislation on the public offer of securities and
seeking views on reforming public offers of securities within the E.U."
7 2
recognized that, theoretically at least, mutually recognized prospectuses
provided companies with the advantage of being able to access the
widest possible range of investors across the European Union.73  The
economic benefits of a cross-border offering system are obvious. On the
one hand, it allows investors the opportunity invest in a wider range of
companies and diversify their risk more easily across the economies of
several Member States. On the other hand, companies would be able to
access a much wider pool of investors.74 Furthermore, with a single
framework in place, European issuers should - theoretically, anyway -
be able to access capital markets in multiple states at a low cost. Thus,
in its ideal form the directives on the listing and offering of securities
were to benefit both investors and issuers.
Various theories exist for the infrequent use of cross-border
offerings, but all focus on the complexity75 , uncertainty, cost and lack of
a harmonized securities law under the current directive-based system.76
The specific reasons are varied and are a product of "unnecessary
differences in the various jurisdictions of the E.U."77 The reasons
include: translation costs, 78 compliance with individual countries'
70. See Proposed Prospectus Directive, supra note 3, at "General Comments"
(pointing out that unless the directives in place undergo revision, "the European financial
market will remain fragmented ... [and] cross border capital raising will remain the
exception, rather than the rule - the antithesis of the logic of the single currency"); see
also Scott, supra note 26, at 82; Initial Report, supra note 6, at 15-17.
71. Scott, supra note 26, at 83 (citing A. Ostrovsky & U. Harnishfeger, Deutsche
Telekom in Global Balancing Act, FIN. TIMES, May 15, 2000 at 33).
72. See Public Offers Report, supra note 64.
73. See id at 18. See also Scott, supra note 26, at 82.
74. Public Offers Report, supra note 64, at 18.
75. See Initial Report, supra note 6, at 17 (arguing that the large quantity of
regulatory authorities creates inefficiency, unnecessary cost and confusion for issuers).
76. See id. at 16 (pointing out that issuers are required to comply with differing
requirements "in order to gain the approval of local Regulatory Authorities" and that the
absence of a generally agreed definition of "public offer" across the E.U. means that
'public offers' may in fact be defined as 'private placements' depending on the regulations
of a particular Member State jurisdiction).
77. Id. at 2.
78. See Proposed Prospectus Directive, supra note 3, at "General Comments"
(pointing out that a requirement to "fully translate the content of a prospectus does not
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information and disclosure requirements, 79 and legal expenses incurred
to determine how investors in each Member State need to be notified.0
The predominant theory holds that transaction costs incurred by using
the mutual recognition procedure are too high and pose a stumbling
block for issuers, especially for small and medium-sized issuers who
typically have limited finances."' A frequent commentator in the
securities field also theorizes that the cross-border offering directives
are infrequently utilized due to "the wide scope for private placements
within the [E.U.] and the relative ease of the resale of privately
distributed securities to public investors."
82
PART IV:PROPOSALS TOWARD HARMONIZING THE CROSS-BORDER
OFFERING SYSTEM
A. The FESCO Issuer Passport Proposal
While the E.U. has discussed perfecting its cross-border offering
system of regulation in past years,"3 not until recently had concrete
corrective measures been advanced by the European Commission."
Prior to the publication of the Proposed Prospectus Directive, proposals
suggested retaining the current structure, under which the receiving
state competent authorities recognize "incoming" prospectuses, but
removing the ability of these authorities to require some or all
additional information or translation.' The Forum of European
Securities Commission's (FESCO) 2000 European "Passport" for Issuers
provides the most concrete plan to improve and at the same time to
simplify the system of cross-border securities offerings. 6 FESCO was
founded in 1997 with the mission of developing uniform standards of
regulation in Europe's financial markets." Drafted at the bequest of
the European Commission, FESCO's European Passport Report
recognized that the system is meant to facilitate cross-border offerings,
and that the level of disclosure should be the same for both listed and
encourage multinational offerings or admission to trading").
79. See Financial Services Action Plan, supra note 3, at 6 (stating that production of
multiple sets of documentation to conform with national requirements in order to offer
securities in a second or third Member State is costly and inhibits pan-E.U. capital-
raising activity).
80. See Scott, supra note 26, at 83.
81. Public Offers Report, supra note 69, at art. 5.6.
82. See Scott, supra note 26, at 83.
83. See generally Financial Services Action Plan, supra note 3.
84. See Proposed Prospectus Directive, supra note 3.
85. See Financial Services Action Plan, supra note 3.
86. European Passport Report, supra note 8.
87. See FESCO's Organization, supra note 7.
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unlisted securities.' But FESCO goes on to boldly suggest that "the
level of disclosure should be the same throughout the E.U. market and
therefore no difference should exist between domestic and cross-border
issues." The incorporation of this specific proposal would be a
dramatically positive step towards complete harmonization of securities
regulation because the disclosure standards would be uniform
throughout the E.U. Complete harmonization in the information
disclosure requirements would remedy the twin reasons for the lack of
cross-border offerings: it would create greater efficiency in terms of
issuers' abilities to disclose once to one regulator, and by lowering the
transaction costs associated with disclosure and multi-State offerings or
listings. Under the current system, the level of securities market
regulation varies dramatically from one Member State to another. The
directives described above after all stipulate only the minimum
required disclosure standards, allowing Member States, if so inclined,
to require greater disclosure. Consequently, the level of regulation runs
the spectrum from the minimum directive requirements to highly
complex regulatory disclosure systems.
FESCO proposed the creation of a uniform regulatory system
thereby creating certainty vis-&-vis the treatment of investors in all
jurisdictions. The rationale behind the FESCO proposal is
simplification of the steps issuers wishing to extend offers to other
Member States need to undertake. This requires replacing the "mutual
recognition principle with a procedure based on 'simple notification.'"9
The notification would be based on enhanced European disclosure
standards that follow those disclosure standards created by
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).91
FESCO's Issuer Passport balances the dual needs for investor
protection on the one hand with issuer efficiency on the other. The
advantages to European investors under this proposal are that
investors will: (i) have access to securities offered by other European
companies, and (ii) have the same information throughout the E.U. The
advantages for issuers of the European Passport are the reduction of
bureaucratic work, while at the same time gaining access to all of the
E.U. Member States with little more effort than is currently necessary
to obtain approval for a domestic offering. Additionally, the "Issuer
Passport" minimizes the risk that an issuance gets to the market after
market conditions have changed, courtesy of the optional shelf
registration system.
Under the FESCO proposal, the home country authority (where the
88. See European Passport Report, supra note 8, at 5.
89. Id.
90. See European Passport Report, supra note 8, at 3.
91. Id.
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issuer has its registered office or its primary listing) would fully control
the entire set of documents relating to the securities offering.' Once
the prospectus is approved by the home country authority, the issuer
may make an offer or list its shares in other Member States by simply
notifying its intention to the competent authorities where it is making
the offer.93 The notification would be accompanied by the approved
prospectus, the approval certificate, and if required, a translation of the
summary of the prospectus. Under the proposal, the host country
authority would not be allowed to ask for further information. Adoption
of the enhanced European IOSCO-based disclosure standards would
replace the current disclosure requirements provided in the Listing
Particulars Directive and the Public Offering Prospectus Directive,
thereby creating greater uniformity.9
Finally, while the FESCO proposal deals with creating uniformity
in the notification and disclosure system, a major part of creating that
uniformity will require the adoption of uniform accounting standards.'
Like the varying degrees of securities regulation employed by Member
States, there is not a uniform accounting standard to which all
Members adhere.97 Under the current system, preparation of disclosure
documents is burdensome because of the lack of universally accepted
accounting practices. IOSCO has "urged the development of
internationally accepted accounting and auditing standards" to remedy
this problem. 9' However, adoption of international accounting
standards, though necessary to the success of harmonizing system of
cross-border offerings, will not be without hurdles and such standards
"will need to be flexible enough to support variations resulting from
peculiarities in legal, tax, and regulatory structure, differing economic
environments", and other country-specific circumstances.'
B. Other Developments in the Sphere of Capital Markets Integration
In February 2001, the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of
European Securities Markets, chaired by Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy,
urged the creation of a single Committee of European Securities
Regulators with the specific mandate of drafting legislation to facilitate
an improved and better integrated pan-E.U. securities market for the
92. See European Passport Report, supra note 8, at 4.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Initial Report, supra note 6, at 16.
97. See id.
98. See Samuel Wolff, Recent Developments in International Securities Regulation, 23
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY 347, 402 (1995).
99. See Sulger, supra note 35, at 236.
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European Commission's review." The Lamfalussy Report, to which it
is referred, envisioned that the legislation would be the product of the
advice of a second independent committee of European regulators, made
up of Member State representatives from "competent authorities in the
securities field."'' Over some disagreement in the European
Parliament regarding the powers of the proposed Committee of
European Securities Regulators (CESR), the European Commission set
up the CESR in May 2001.'0 It takes over the work of harmonizing
securities offerings once undertaken by FESCO.'0 3 FESCO created the
Constitution for the CESR whose role is laid out as (i) improving
coordination between securities regulators, (ii) advising the European
Commission in regards to the drafting of measures in the securities
industry, and (iii) working to ensure "more consistent and timely day-
to-day implementation of community legislation in the Member
States."" Some have criticized the creation of committees such as the
CESR because of the likelihood that it will be slow in implementing
changes.° 5
C. The Proposed Prospectus Directive
On May 30, 2001, the European Commission produced its Proposed
Prospectus Directive. In view of the urgency surrounding the upgrade
of the two existing Prospectus Directives - namely the Listing
Particulars Directive and the Public Offering Prospectus Directive, both
discussed above - and in view of the "extensive consultation" already
undertaken by FESCO (especially in its European Passport for Issuers),
the European Commission produced its Proposed Directive without
"delay[ing] it through recourse to a more formal consultation process as
foreseen in the Lamfalussy Report."'06
Broadly stated, the Proposed Prospectus Directive adopts many of
the ideas laid out by FESCO in its European Passport Report. The
Proposed Prospectus Directive is very 'pro-passport' in terms of the
information to be contained in each prospectus issued to each Member
100. See John Willman, New Pledge on Securities Plan, FIN. TIMES, June 20, 2001,
available at http'/www.ft.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
101. See John Willman, New Pledge on Securities Plan, FIN. TIMES, June 20, 2001,
available at httpJ/www.ft.com (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See Continuity and orderly functioning of markets in Europe, M2 PRESSWIRE,
Sept. 12, 2001, available at 2001 WL 26353828.
105. See Proposed Prospectus Directive, supra note 3, at "General Comments"
(expressing the view that to application of the "more formal process" envisioned in the
Lamfalussy Report would be to merely "delay" a proposal, unappealing to the Commission
in light of the "urgency' of a new framework and the extensiveness of consultation already
carried out).
106. See Proposed Prospectus Directive, supra note 3, at "General Comments".
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State, and the features of the Proposed Prospectus Directive were based
on (i) introduction of enhanced disclosure standards in line with
international standards, (ii) introduction of a registration document
system so as to ensure annual update of key issuer information, (iii) the
possibility of offering securities to trading on the basis of simple
notification of the prospectus approved by the home competent
authority, and (iv) concentration of responsibilities in the home
administrative competent authority.' 7  The Proposed Prospectus
Directive would do away with the "existing mutual recognition system"
and replace that with a "simple notification system," akin to that used
by those E.U. directives involving financial services' and as envisioned
in FESCO's European Passport Report.'O' Therefore, under this system,
host or secondary Member State, authorities would be unable to request
additional information in a prospectus."0 Furthermore, the Proposed
Prospectus Directive tackles the issue of multiple translations, a
transaction cost that some consider a deterrent to cross-border offerings
and stock exchange listings."' The Proposal states that "host Member
States competent authorities shall only be entitled to ask for a
translation of the summary of the prospectus provided that the full
prospectus is drafted in a language which is customary in the sphere of
finance (normally English)"."' Thus, the key feature of the Proposed
Prospectus Directive is a single set of disclosure documents, regardless
of the size of the issuer, to be filed with the home Member State
competent authority, and thereafter notified to host Member State
competent authorities as appropriate. This has proved to be a
significant point of contention, with several European securities
industry groups arguing that small- and medium-sized enterprise
issuers (SMEs) will be adversely affected by such a requirement."'
In September 2001, in advance of the first scheduled meeting of the
Committee of European Securities Regulators held on September 11,
107. See Proposed Prospectus Directive, supra note 3, at "General Comments".
108. Id.
109. See European Passport Report, supra note 8, at 3.
110. See Proposed Prospectus Directive, supra note 3, at "General Comments".
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Jonathan Todd, Letter to the Editor: Prospectus Proposal Would Lower Cost of
Raising Capital, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001, available at www.ft.com (last visited Feb. 21,
2002).
114. See Andrew Crooke, Brussels Study Deepens Divide over EU Prospectus Laws,
available at www.legalmediagroup.com (last visited Jan. 20, 2002); see also London Stock
Exchange, Comments from the London Stock Exchange on the Proposed Prospectus
Directive, (Sept. 2001), available at
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/presspdfs/pdwebstory.pdf (last visited Feb. 11,
2002) (arguing that mandatory prospectus filing and annual updates for all issuers will
significantly burden SMEs in terms of increasing the cost of raising capital) [hereinafter
LSE Comments].
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the Financial Times reported in two separate articles on European
banks' and securities firms' opposition to the Commission's Proposed
Prospectus Directive. 5 Three associations - the International Primary
Market Association, the International Securities Market Association,
and the Bond Market Association - accused the European Commission
of failing to "consult widely enough" in the securities industry prior to
its publication and demanded the E.U. to either drop its proposal or
turn it into a consultation paper, which could be watered down or
blocked."'6 In terms of membership, these three entities encompass
virtually all of Europe's banks and securities firms."' In spite of their
claims to support a single European "passport" for issuers, the
associations said that the proposal failed to address key issues and
needed to be fundamentally rewritten to correct a number of errors and
omissions which could have been avoided had market consultation
taken place before the draft directive was published."' Specifically, the
associations alleged inadequate treatment of "common liability
standards, due diligence, common definitions of a public offer, nor did it
accelerate the time for approval of prospectuses to meet securities
deadlines."" 9 Critics point out that a "one size fits all" regime would be
too burdensome on SMEs looking to access the capital markets because
they would need to incur unnecessary costs to produce the requisite
documentation and opinions." Others point out that:
Requirements that issuers file a prospectus with the competent
authority of the Member State in which they have their registered
office would fragment the markets and distort competition, they say.
Regulators would impose varying levels of disclosure, stunting the goal
of a single passport. And the Commission's shelf registration system
would require issuers to expend the cost of registering an update of a
large part of their prospectus for scrutiny every year, regardless of
whether or not they access the capital markets."'
Finally, the associations allege that the Proposal would increase the
115. See Vincent Boland, Call to Scrap Share Reform, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2001,
available at http://www.ft.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2002); see also Vincent Boland,
Opposition Mounts to EU Securities Directive, FIN. TIMES Sept. 7, 2001, available at
http'/www.ft.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2002); Andrew Crooke, Securities Markets Attack
EU Prospectus Reforms, Legal Media Group, Sept. 9, 2001, available at
httpJ/www.legalmediagroup.com (last visited Sept. 10, 2001).
116. See Call to Scrap Share Reform, supra note 115.
117. Id.
118. See Securities Markets Attack EU Prospectus Reforms, supra note 115.
119. See Trade Associations Want EC to Drop or Redo Directive, SEC. IND. NEWS, Oct.
1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 6554070.
120. Andrew Crooke, Brussels Report to Suggest 60 Changes to Prospectus Directive,
Dec. 2, 2001, available at httpJ/www.legalmediagroup.com (last visited Feb. 10, 2002).
See also LSE Comments, supra note 114.
121. Trade Associations, supra note 119.
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cost of raising capital in Europe.2
The criticism to the proposed Directive was met with a vigorous
defense launched by the European Commission's Spokesman for the
Internal Market and Taxation Jonathan Todd and published in the
Financial Times as a letter to the editor.In Attempting to clear up some
of the "misunderstandings" about the Proposed Prospectus Directive,
Mr. Todd addressed the fact that the Proposed Prospectus Directive
created a single definition of both "public offer" ' and "home member
state" and called the Proposed Prospectus Directive a "framework
directive," akin to that proposed in the Lamfalussy Report's
recommendations, and stated that more detail would be produced in
subsequent and more technical directives.' Insinuating that certain
critics wish to maintain the status quo, Mr. Todd maintained that the
door remained open for "constructive and informed comments" on the
proposal.'6
The Proposed Prospectus Directive has suffered another setback.
On December 2, 2001, it was announced that a draft report,
commissioned by the European Parliamentary Committee on Economic
and Monetary Affairs, and to be presented on December 4, proposed
.around sixty amendments to the Proposed Directive. 2 ' The report,
prepared by Mr. Chris Huhne, a member of the British Parliament,
features prominently reduction of the burden on SMEs, "making the
'shelf registration' system optional, and leaving a degree of choice of
competent authority to issuers," m a proposal that the London Stock
Exchange favors very much. 129 It remains to be seen what effects this
report and the numerous comments, reports and criticism that abound
will have on the viability of the Proposed Prospectus Directive.
CONCLUSION
To truly appreciate what has been done in terms of improving the
securities regulation to its current form in the E.U. and the direction in
which it is heading, one must consider the history of such regulation in
the E.U. This aside I think will better explain regulation as it stands in
the E.U. presently as well as the susceptibility and proclivity for future
122. See id.
123. Todd, supra note 113.
124. Until the Proposed Prospectus Directive arrived, a common definition of the term
.public offer" had eluded the European Commission. See Public Offering Prospectus
Directive, supra note 25, at Introduction (stating that "so far, it has proved impossible to
furnish a common definition of the term 'public offer' and all its constituent parts").
125. See Todd, supra note 113.
126. See Todd, supra note 113.
127. See Crooke, supra note 114.
128. Id.
129. See LSE Comments, supra note 114, at art. 4.2.
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changes. "[In the 1980s, seven of the twelve E.U. countries did not
require prospectus disclosure to investors in public offerings. 30
Furthermore, no Member States "had a securities regulatory agency to
enforce the laws that did exist."'' As late as 1990, "nine of the twelve
Member States failed to impose any criminal penalties for insider
trading of securities." 132  These figures demonstrate that while
regulatory agencies are now in place, these agencies are not
particularly well-established, as opposed the United States' own SEC,
which was created over sixty years ago.' Arguably, the lack of
foundation and deep-rooted history among the various E.U. securities
regulators makes the propensity for modification care of a "passport"
approach laid out in the Proposed Prospectus Directive that much
higher. Furthermore, associations made up of Member State securities
regulators - FESCO, for example - have recognized the need for a
better system and endorsed proposals.
While the European Commission's Proposed Prospectus Directive
provides definitive steps towards effectuating the true harmonization of
the E.U.'s capital markets, there exists some doubt as to the likelihood
that these steps will be taken in their entirety, as evidenced by the
recently published opposition to that Proposal. While there is some
credibility to the claim that individual Member States would prefer not
to lose control over their markets, and that different "attitudes towards
corporate governance and investor protection" may hamper
integration,' the E.U. has had substantial success in the integration of
its Member States in the economic and financial arenas. As was the
case with the controversy over adoption of the Euro as Europe's
singular currency, one will note that the Euro was so adopted.
Furthermore, the commencement of the European Monetary Union
(E.M.U.) and the formation of a European Central Bank also exemplify
E.U. Member States' willingness to evolve into a more unified economic
powerhouse, because doing so is in both of their individual and
collective interests. With much of E.U. corporate financing shifting
from a dependency on bond issuances, bank lending and other credit-
based mechanisms to a reliance on equity markets and the recognition
that there are better ways for European companies to raise such
capital, the tide is moving in the direction of legislative changes. The
advantage to companies of a cost-effective means of raising capital
through access to the widest range of investors is of course great. And,
130. Manning Gilbert Warren III, The European Union's Investment Services Directive,
15 U. PA.. J. INT'L. Bus. L. 181, 185 (1994).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 186.
133. The U.S. Congress created the SEC in 1934. See Introduction-The SEC: What
We Do, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtnl (last visited Feb. 5, 2002).
134. See Initial Report, supra note 6, at 20.
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with general recognition that so-called "patchwork of regulation 1 5
currently in place creates uncertainty and increased costs for issuers 136
the current system cannot remain in place for much longer. The
simplicity behind the notion of a passport-based system in which one
prospectus approved by an issuer's home country authority, which
would have to be accepted throughout the EU for public offer and/or
admission to trading on regulated markets is certainly an attractive
one. Whether the Proposed Prospectus Directive will undergo a greater
degree of revision or not, especially with regards to the concerns about
SMEs, remains uncertain. However, with the Committee of European
Securities Regulators now in session, and recognition on the part of not
only the European Commission, but by the. industry commentators and
players that the system of cross-border offerings calls for greater
efficiency, improvements in the efficiency and integration of the E.U.'s
financial markets are certainly forthcoming.
135. See Ragbag of Reform, supra note 16.
136. See id.
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